Panpsychism as personal experience: Resolving a paradox by Cotton, Jonathan
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Theses : Honours Theses 
2004 
Panpsychism as personal experience: Resolving a paradox 
Jonathan Cotton 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons 
 Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cotton, J. (2004). Panpsychism as personal experience: Resolving a paradox. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/
theses_hons/960 
This Thesis is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons/960 




You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose 
of your own research or study.  
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or 
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site.  
You are reminded of the following: 
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons 
who infringe their copyright.  
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a 
copyright infringement.  
 A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to 
offences and infringements relating to copyright material.  Higher 
penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for 
offences and infringements involving the conversion of material 
into digital or electronic form. 
USE OF THESIS 
 
 
The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis. 
Panpsychism as Personal Experience: Resolving a 
Paradox 
Project: Honours Thesis 
Faculty: CSESS 
Supervisor: Dr Alan Tapper 
By 
Jonathan Cotton 
Associate Supervisor: Dr Peter Bedford 
Student Number: 2003736 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup 
Date: 26111 Nov 2004 
2 
Abstract 
The thesis of panpsychism is that throughout the natural universe there is 
mentality, althouJh I prefer the term "mind". We human beings experience this 
mentality in everyday consciousness and by analogy we are able to assert that 
mentality is not confined to the human experience alone. The extent to which this 
mentality penetrates, or is imbued by, our natural world has been a subject for 
discussion in western schools of philosophy since the ancient Greeks and in the 
even more ancient eastern schools of theosophy, such as Buddhism and the 
Hinduism of the Upanishads. I use the tenn "theosophy" here to bring a sense of 
esoteric speculation to the panpsychism debate (OxfOrd English Die/ ionary). A 
recent resurgence of interest in panpsychism has recognised the inadequacy of the 
materialist persp~ctive, and attempts have been made to resolve the main 
stumbling block, the mind-body/mind-matt~r problem, and to provide a realistic 
and adequate account of panpsychism. But, it is generally accepted by most of 
those interested in the debate and whose works I review, that so far this has not 
succeeded. Therefore, a new and more radical approach is required. 
It is the intention of my thesis to demonstrate that only when we break free 
from our dualistic perspective, a perspective reflective of our thinking mind, our 
language, and our cultural/social constructs, can we intuitively understand the true 
nature of the mind-body relationship. I will argue that the truth of this intuitive 
understanding becomes apparent when we experience what I have tenned 
"personal panpsychic experiences," and that these experiences are 
epistemologically valid. These experiences give rise tv knowledge Jf reality that I 
have called the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective. The "dual-aspect 
singularity" perspective acknowledges the dual nature of reality but asserts that 
any duality as such is merely aspectivism. As such everything that exists has both 
a mental and material aspect, neither of which is ontologieally real, as together 
they fonn a singularity. I will argue that the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective 
resolves the mind-body mind-brain paradox. 
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Preface 
The panpsychic thesis is an intuitive proposition. It has found its expression 
in poetry, art, and spirituality, as well as in philosophy. As such I hope to be able 
to demonstrate that it is not possible to argue the case for panpsychism to a 
satisfactory conclusion without recourse to an intuitive perspective. It was 
personal experience that has led me to consider this question well before I came to 
understand the definition of the term "panpsychism." It is the intention of this 
thesis to argue for a position that draws on intuitive knowledge gained from the 
"personal panpsychic experience." To demonstrate the kind of experience I am 
talking about, let me recount the following story: 
I was standing in about twenty.:five centimetres of water when 
something bit me on the ankle. As I jerked my foot up and out of the 
swf a sea snake moved quickly away, headed out to sea. Two tiny 
Apots qf blood were all the evidence /needed to conl'ince myself that I 
had indeed been bitten. I had been travelling in South East Asia and 
Australia long enough to know that when you get bitten by a sea 
snake you die. and the length (?f titRe before you die was always 
discussed in terms of second,·. not hours or minutes, but seconds. For 
some reason I decided at that momcmt that I had seven .\·econdr left. 
You cannot imagine, unless you have been in a similar situation, the 
rush l?{ thought and .feeling that pulsated through me, as my heart 
exploded in my chest and.fi.!elings of dread and anger overwhelmed 
my entire being. But then, as I reached the inevitable conclusion that 
there was no way out qfthis. after exhm~sling eve1y possible option in 
mere flashes qf a second, acceptance took over and calmness came to 
me. flllrned to look back fOr the last time at the beach and the land 
beyond the dunes. Jlet myse(f go and the landscape dissolved. 
This was not Uf!fmni/iar territory; I had been there before and have 
been there since that even!ful day in /97.J. When onlyfour years old I 
WCIS playing with friends in "Jield near the village where /lived on 
the East Coast q{England. We were running qfter a tractor that was 
making its way down a furrowed track alongside ajfeshly rolled field. 
The driwr was unaware that he was being chased by a bunch of kids, 
He was lowing Cl heuvy rib roller. On the hack of the roller was a 
steel mud scapper be~r. It ran the length qfthe roller just wide enough 
fbr the fiJo/ of a small child. Iran and managed to step up onto the 
bw·. I was only there for u moment befiJre /tumbled down between the 
tractor and the roller. My body, luckily, landed in the furrow and was 
saved .fi·om the wail of the roller, but my head was not so lucky. It 
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came to rest more on the centre of the track and the rollers did a nice 
job r?f'opening up the side of my skuf!. 
After being carried by the tractor driver to a nearby farmhouse, my 
mother r.:ame and I travelled in her arms. in a taxi, to Ipswich Town 
Hm.pilal. What is remarkable is 1/wt, although no longer conscious, I 
was completely aware of the whole journey. My consciousness was 
outside my body observing the rush across the field to the farmhouse, 
being laid out on a settee in the parlour, my mother's arrival and the 
.final taxi joumey to hospital. I was not four years old and I was not 
/he 'me' I had thought I was. I wm· detached, impassive, and in some 
sense indifferent. This experience has remained wilh me all my l[fe. 
My mother has complained about my indifference to pain since the 
accidenl. An indifference that nearly took my l[fe again when I was 
len years old, when my appendix burst qfter I had ignored the 
stomach pains for several days, much /o /he amazement of the 
Doctors. So, here I was again, standing on Cl lonely beach on the East 
Coast of Fraser l\·land, far from help and certain of death, detached 
and smiling. 
I was smiling, no/ jus/ another smile, or an ordinllly smile one shows 
to friend\' or loved ones, but a smile of complete and utler 
contentment and joy. The beach, the water, the land, all disappeared; 
dissolved back into the original mind. And in that mind was 
absolutely everything that ever was, thai ever is, and that ever will be. 
Every possible musical note, every possible melody. every possible 
thing, hung su~pended wilhin its own potential to become. There was 
no '/'. There was no 'me', and no 'il' or 'that'. There was nothing, yet 
within thai nothing there was somNhirtg. and together they made 
everything. And I knew, and have known ever since that day: that, 
there is only 'one thing' happening here. 
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Introduction 
The panpsychism thesis has always been a difficul~ if not slightly taboo 
subject for philosophers to discuss, let alone promote in some way, especially 
since the Enlightenment. It is difficult to overstate the impact that the 
Enlightenment philosophy of reason has had on intellectual life in the West. Out 
of the tum10il of the 161h and 1 i 11 centuries, a period some consider to be the birth 
of modem civilisation, we have witnessed, according to Martin Heidegger (Krell, 
1977, pp.243-282), a complete reversal in the way we see ourselves in our 
relationship with our environment. He notes that, at this time, the very meaning of 
the tenns "subject" and "object" underwent a reversal. Prior to the Renaissance, it 
was the surrounding world that had been subject, as supporting one's identity, 
one's sense of self: " ... the word object denoted what one cast before himself in 
mere fantasy ... " (Krell, 1977, p.280). This changed worldview, reinforced by 
Rene Descartes' arguments that split mind and body, was not simply a minor 
adjustment in Western intellectual thought. It has been argued that it ''was 
symptomatic of a sweeping change in consciousness, in human being itself' 
(Rosen, 1994, p.116). Many philosophers, language theorists, writers, and art 
historians have noted the profound. change that occurred during that time. I 
mention this because it is historically significant to the history of the mind/body 
mind/matter problem. This is where Humpty-Dumpty fell off the wall so to speak, 
for no one has managed to put mind and body back together again in such a way 
that resolves this paradoxical problem. 
Paradoxes are important because they point out logical contradictions in our 
assumptions. But, why bother with the mind/body paradox when discussing 
panpsychism? Because the mind/body problem holds the key to understanding the 
panpsychism thesis. There is no point, and no way possible in my view, to try to 
resolve the issue of mind in matter as a metaphysical theory in general, whilst 
attempting to ignore the mind/body problem, sometimes referred to as the "hard" 
problem (Chalmers, 1996, pp.xi-xiii). Ever since Rene Descartes's dictum "I think 
therefore I am," probably the most famous in the history of philosophy, 
philosophers have struggled to reconcile the mind/body split. 
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My argument for a "dual-aspect singularity" is an attempt to introduce an 
intuitive element into the debate. It is an attempt to redefine the way we see our 
world, and it is an attempt to re-evaluate our relationship with it. According to 
Heidegger, the dynamic unity of experience existing prior to the Renaissance was 
not utterly obliterated but regulated to oblivion, forgotten, or repressed. This act of 
forgetting divided self from other and mind from body, we were left to wonder 
how such "fundamentally different" entities could interact (Rosen, 1994, p.\17). 
"Is it not obvious," Rosen asks rhetorically, "that as long as we continue to 
operate within the Renaissance framework of forgetfulness, the mind-matter 
problem cannot authentically be solved, since operating within that framework is 
precisely what is responsible for the problem?" (Rosen, 1994, p.I17). 
My thesis, and the arguments for it, are attempts to understand the mind-
matter problem from a new perspective. It is a perspective that embraces "being" 
rather than "thinking". I have not tackled this problem because I think I know the 
answer necessarily, but because I believe a significant area of inquiry has not yet 
been fully explored. I believe my "dual-aspect singularity" perspective and the 
justification for it, which I will explore in this thesis, will help open up that new 
approach to the problem. In the light of the latest discoveries in quantum physics, 
new research into the human brain activity, and a general acknowledgment that 
science with its mechanistic world view can not answer all of our questions, we 
need to consider alternative approaches 1• The alternative approach that I will be 
arguing for in this thesis is one that validates human experience as not merely a 
thinking being, separate and distinct from our universe, but one of becoming, 
involved and integrated within our universe. I will be drawing on examples of the 
kind of experiences humans can have, and have had, that suggest our ordinary 
worldview is flawed, that it is dominated by a divisive egotistical thinking 
mind/brain that, in its effort to establish its own sense of subjective self-
importance, separates itself from a now objectivised world. I intend to 
demonstrate that it is only because we are unable, in nonnal circumstances, to 
experience the world in a holistic way, incorporating both subjectival and 
objectival dimensions, that we mistake our shackled dualistic perspective for a 
1 For further discussion see bibliography, in particular Griffin, Jacobs, de Quincey and Clarke. 
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true interpretation of our universe and our relationship within it. Below is a brief 
outline of my arguments for the thesis: 
1) It is possible, and 1 suggest desirable, to have experiences in which our nonnal 
perception, dominated by our thinking mind, ceases. I have referred to these 
experiences as "personal panpsychic experiences". A "personal panpsychic 
experience" is one in which the individual is no longer aware of the past or the 
future, and consequently time appears to stand still. It is ''panpsychic" 
because the individual becomes aware that the mind has expanded to include 
everything, leaving one with a deep sense of oneness or completeness. I will 
argue that knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" is 
epistemologically valid. That is, that ontological knowledge of unity and 
wholeness, acquired under this kind of non-conceptualised personal 
experience(s), is valid and needs to be taken into account when considering 
the mind/body mind/matter problem. 
2) As a result of having such experiences those persons come to see the world 
differently from their previously established dualistically orientated world-
view. The perceived dualism, from our nonnal experience of subject-objective 
reality, can now be considered to be dual aspectivism. That is, by seeing the 
world around us in light of the intuitive knowledge acquired through "personal 
panpsychic experiences" we are able to understand that the dualism we 
nonnally experience is simply a dual-aspect of the same thing, a universal 
singularity. 
3) From this position I will argue that everything that exists has both a mental 
and a material aspect and that neither is ontologically real. The tenn I have 
adopted to describe this perspective is the "dual-aspect singularity" 
perspective. This perspective acknowledges the apparent dualism of mind-
matter but argues that it is merely illusory, and, because this duality is illusory, 
we are left with the conclusion that the nature of reality is singular. Even 
though this account does not readily appeal to our nonnal rational mental 
states of mind, which are subject to restrictive dualistic mental language, there 
are ways of intuitively approaching the mind-matter dilemma. So the last part 
of my argument in support of my thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" is a 
discussion about how we might be able to approach the mind/body paradox. I 
II 
assert that one of the ways we can intuitively understand this thesis is in the 
application and consideration of the Moebiu~ Principle. The Moebius 
Principle is important to my argument because it demonstrates that there are 
aspects and dimensions in reality that we have difficulty comprehending 
through our nonnal senses, and yet obviously exist. Once the thesis is 
accepted panpsychism can also be understood as a realistic and understandable 
thesis in physical and mental tenns. 
As you can see from the diagram in Appendix 1, I have located my 
argument as an argument from realism. Although there might be a tendency to 
claim my position is monistic, because of the "singularity" aspect, and therefore 
should more appropriately be considered to be either idealistic r ~· ,, >tterialistic. To 
consider either to be appropriate would be to miss the essential point that neither 
matter nor mind is ontologically real. Further more, qualifying its monistic 
tendency by suggesting it has a "dualwaspect" avoids any argument about what 
exactly any monism might be made up of, either mind or matter. "Dual-
aspectivism" incorporates both. Neither matter nor mind holds supreme position 
in the equation. They are considered to be, in simplistic tenns, both entirely 
necessary in the construction of the real universe, even though they are aspects of 
a "singularity" only. 
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Chapter 1- The Panpsychism Thesis and the Debate 
1.1 The Significa~e of the Panpsychism Debate 
The significance of the pa.npsychic thesis can not in my view be overstated; 
it is one of the niost important and excitin'g philosophical positions. The 
arguments for and against the position address two unresolved queStions: What 
exactly is the relationship between mind, as experienced by human beings, and 
body, understood as a complex organisatian of matter? And how far, if8t all, ·::.1oes 
this mind exte~d to other inaterial objects or penetrate into the structure of the 
universe? Ideas on these problems range from one end of the p~ilosophicill 
spectrum to the other. Prom the materialist's perspective, that the mind is purel~ a. 
product of the brain, to the view that mind is separate from matter, and yet 
somehow connected to it, and manifesting only as an epiphenomenon peculiar to 
' 
humans. The materialist's view holds that all is matter and. that out Of matter 
everything is made manifest. Others see the world in dualistic tenns, of which 
there are two basic types: "substance dualists," who think that mind and body 
name two kinds of substances, and "property dualists," who think mind and body 
are two separate properties·of one thing- a Kuman being for example ·(Searle, 
1997, p.135). The other monistic perspective, the idealist's view, sa:ys that mind 
may be considered as a unified whole, or God, and that matter is illusory~ 
It has been acknowledged by some of the current thinkers in this area that 
there needs to be some kind of breakthrough in the mind~body debate before 
further progress can be made. Thomas Nagel has said that the drive to 4evelop a 
physicalist account of mind has led to "extremely implausible positions" (Griffin, 
1998 p.4). Other authors have also pointed out the problems face4 in attempting to 
resolve the mind-body question. David Chalmers rather eloquently sugiests that 
"you can't have your materialist cake and eat your consciousness too" (Chalmers, 
1996, p.28). Colin McGinn argues that our present perplexity is tenninal, that we 
will never be able to resolve the mystery of how consciousness could emerge from 
the brain. He says that "somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is 
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turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a complete blank on the nature 
of1his c?nVersion ... The mind-body problem is the prOblem of understanding how 
this miracle is wrought" (McGinn, 1982, pp.99-120). 2 Dave Ray Griffin goes as 
far as to suggest that a new and entirely radical approach is necessary to address 
the problem, agreeing with Nagel,3 who asserts that "nothing but radical 
speculation gives us hope of coming up with any candidates for truth", and Galen 
Strawson,4 who declar~s thcit ''the enonnity oft~ mind-body problem" requires a 
"radical solution" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.5). 
~anpsychism has enjoyed a long controversial history, and has been 
presentea in a variety of guises,, and fonnulations. Although the tenn itself is 
relatively new, the concept has been around since ancient times, long preceding 
any_ western philosophical systematic records. Versions of the thesis are well 
recorded in Buddhist and Hindu texts. But, the first time the word 'Panpsychism' 
was used in the English language, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
,, was in 1879, in~ book by G. H. Lewes: Mind as a Function qfOrganism. Paul 
Edwards, in his exc~llent but highly critical essay on panpsychism in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards, 1967), traces the lineage of eminent 
' 
thinkers in antiquity, where evidence of panpsychist ideas can be found endorsed 
in the. teachings or _y.'ritings of "Presocratic" philosophers such as Thales, 
Anaximenes, Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. 
· The two most important, players in early modern panpsychism would have 
• to be Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). 
"Spinoza regarded both mi~d and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the 
eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God" (Seager, 2001, p.5). 
Leibniz, on the· Other hand, saw the cosmos as made up from many separate 
substances he called monads. These monads he considered were essentially 
mentalistic. 
2 Other writers have made similar suggestions: WilliamS. Robinson, in Brains and People (1988), 
suggests that there is no story that can account for the phenomenon of the experience of pain and 
the relationship of brain neurones to pain. William Seager in Metaphysics of Consciousness, who 
says that in spite of holding that physicalism "still deserves our allegiance" (p,224), he says that 
"the degree of difficulty in fonnulating an explicate version of physicalism which is not subject to 
immediately powerful objections is striking" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.4). 
~For a more detailed discussion see Thomas Nagel's A View from Nowhere (1986). 
4 For a more detailed discussion see Galen Strawson 's Mental Reality (1994). 
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It was Rene Descartes who, after his most famous assertion "I think 
therefore I am," delivered the greatest blow to the panpsychic thesis. Cartesian 
dualism posited the mind-body split; claiming that mind or souls are separate from 
matter just because they have sentience, whereas "matter is a 'dumb' thing, 
without intrinsic sentience" (de Quincey, 2002, p.21). This dualistic perspective 
has had the effect of restricting our thinking and as a consequence our language, 
leaving us to describe our world in objectival terms. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the thesis was extensively 
discussed under the influence of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, with one 
of the more sensible discussions provided by William James (Clarke, 2003, p.vii). 
In his 1890 publication of Principles of Psychology, James asserts, "If evolution is 
to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the 
very origin of things" (James, 1950, p.l49). He goes on to suggest that: 
Each atom of the nebula, they (clear-sighted evolutionary p1tilosophers) 
suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it; 
and, just as the material atoms have fonned bodies and brains by massing 
themselves together, so the mental atoms, by an analogous process of 
aggregation, have fused into those larger consciousnesses which we know in 
ourselves and suppose to exist in our fellow animals. 
James, of course was working from the cosmological knowledge of the day. 
Yet even today, as Clarke (2003, p.viii) points out, ''the transition from bare 
matter to material systems with a mental perspective on things remains an 
unexplained puzzle." Others advocating some version of the panpsychic thesis 
during this period were Royce, Lotze, and Schopenhauer, to name a few. 
According to Clarke, whether influenced by Hegelian idealism or not, they all 
regarded any philosophical endeavour in providing an explanation for matters 
outside the scope of the empirical sciences as an essential mission of philosophy 
(2004, p.l 07). Karl Popper, and A. J. Ayer, "regarded panpsychism as an obstacle 
to the progress of scientific inquiiy," and according to Ayer, "meaningless" as it 
violated what was referred to as the "verifiability criterion of meaningfulness" 
(Clarke, 2004, p.107). In other words, "any meaningful hypothesis must be 
caplble of being empirically tested." 
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1.2 Terms Defined 
The etymology of the tenn ''panpsychisrn" is the best place to start. Pan is 
Greek for "all," and Psyche to the early Greek philosophers, means "soul," the 
principle of life, distinguishing it from all that is inanimate or dead. In my thesis I 
use the tenn consciousness to denote all levels of the human experience of 
consciousness and mentality as cognitive activity within human consciousness. 
The tenn mind, I suggest denotes that which is held as equal to, and married to 
matter. This is not a preliminary definition of a human mind. It is, rather, a 
description that distinguishes the human experience of mentality from the broader 
idea of mind being involved in all matter. Other authors have used these same 
tenns but with different meanings. I have suggested the above to try to avoid 
confusing the mental activity we experience in our everyday consciousness with 
any kind of mentality that might go on outside our own consciousness. In 
philosophy, in general, the mind-matter, mind-world, mind-body, and mind-brain 
problems have been treated separately. In my thesis I~onsider them all to be one 
and the same pmblem, that is, that "world" "body" and "brain" are all "matter," 
and that the duality of all those relationships is the problem, and not the various 
kinds of matter discussed in those relationships. 
1.3 Current Thinking: A Review 
Little philosophical work has been carried out on panpsychism over the last 
seventy years. The same cannot be said for the mind-body problem which has 
been the subject of enormous debate since the nineteen sixties. It is possible to 
count the number of serious contributors to the current panpsychism debate on 
two hands. Although several other writers, whilst not providing a full scale 
defence of panpsychism, have, nevertheless, been sympathetic towards it, when 
dealing with the problem of consciousness (Seager, 2001, p.9). The philosophers 
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that have vigorously entered the debate in recent times are authors such as David 
Ray Griffin, Colin McGinn, Christian de Quincey, D. S. Clarke, Thomas Nagel, 
Williain Seager, Timothy Sprigge, and Freya Mathews (For references see 
bibliQb>raphy). 
Any review of the current panpsychism argument, in its various fonns, and 
with its various positions and conclusions, would not be complete without 
acknowledging the works of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, whose defence 
of panpsychist philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century was 
significant. After the publication of Whitehead's Process and Reality in 1929, and 
along with a flourish of other works dealing with panpsychism, such as C.D. 
Broad's Mind cmd Its Place in Nature in 1925, one would have expected an 
ongoing robust and engaging debate to ensue. However, the debate was short 
lived at that time. And, as Seager (2001, p.9) points out, the world took a different 
direction. With the advent of such great advances in technology and science, 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of reality was now deemed somewhat 
unnecessary, and certainly, to the new wave of scientific materialists, 
unwarranted, unless of course the results of such inquiry were science~ftiendly. In 
anticipation that science would indeed sort out these problems of mind and matter, 
and with the advent of a new logical positivist philosophy dominating 
philosophical thinking at that time, nothing of any significance in tenns of a 
philosophical defence of panpsychism happened for some fifty years. 
The resurgence of interest in panpsychism is a relatively recent affair, for as 
I have suggested, the matter lay resting, and some no doubt thought finally put to 
bed, albeit unresolved. But, Whitehead's ideas of a "process" or "event" 
orientated panpsychism nevertheless provided a springboard from which today's 
panpsychism debate has sprung. Theologian and philosopher David Ray Griffin 
prefers the term "panexperientialism" to describe this process~based ontology 
(Griffin, 1998, pp. 27~116). Also, ideas coming out of the new sciences, such as 
Quantum and Complexity theories, did not put to rest any of the old questions 
about the nature of reality; they simply, once reasonably understood, changed the 
way we now think about the same old 'hard' problem questions. 
It must be said, however, that there have been a few philosophers who were 
reluctant to let things drop. The most important was Charles Hartshorne, whose 
reformulation of Whitehead's technically cumbersome process philosophy kept 
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the subject alive through those barren years, and provided present day 
philosophers such as David Ray Griffin and Christian de Quincey with enough 
grist to develop their own versions of the panpsychism argument. Griffin's 
""panexperientialism" was derived from Whitehead's and Hartshorne's process 
philosophy, and has much in common with de Quincey's "'radical naturalism" 
which asserts that matter·energy is considered fundamental and real, but to its 
roots intrinsically sentient (de Quincey, 2002, pp.217·218). Whitehead was not 
happy with either the ""universal mechanism" model5 that was being heavily 
promoted at the end of the nineteenth century as the correct view of our natural 
world, or with the alternative "humanism" model6 derived from the Greek 
philosophers and promoted through Descartes' Cartesian dualism (Clarke, 2003, 
p.30). The problem Whitehead and many others had, and still have, with 
universal mechanism is that it seems inconsistent with our own self-evident 
experience of a sense of freedom in our decision making, and subjectivity in 
general. 
Whitehead and Hartshorne on Process Philosophy 
According to Clarke (2003, p.31), Whitehead's process or "events" 
orientated philosophy was derived from Leibniz's Monadology.7 After rejecting 
the two dominant philosophical positions on the nature of reality as unacceptable, 
Whitehead proposed replacing them with an unrestricted panpsychism. 
Understanding that Leibniz's metaphysical system was flawed in that it didn't 
explain fully or adequately the relationship between the mental and the physical, 
Whitehead tried to correct these problems by replacing the concept of monads or 
5 
"Universal mechanism" holds that any event or behaviour, human or otherwise, has detennining 
antecedent causes. In universal mechanistic tenns, mind, as an epiphenomenal experience, is the 
direct result ofbrain activity. 
6 The perspective of philosophical humanism holds that human beings are metaphysically different 
from other lower fonns of life. It is dualistic in nature and Whitehead referred to this as the 
"bifurcation of nature." 
7 Leibniz's Monadology is based on the understanding that every appropriately organised body has 
what Leibniz calls a "dominant monad", and any parts of this body in turn have their dominant 
monads. Reality consists of arrangements of monads within monads ad infinitum. The regression 
does not stop at simple particles •vithout parts, instead Leibniz suggests the concept of a "simple 
substance", the most primitive of souls without extension or fonn. As each monad is a perfect 
reflection of the universe, synchronised in a perfect hannony, therefore, there is no need for one 
monad to act in any way upon another monad (Russell, 1946, pp.563-576). 
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souls with psychic events called "actual entities" or "actual occasions." These 
events had two component aspects or "poles": a physical aspect that relates to the 
immediate environment and a conceptual aspect that allows for anticipating the 
future (Whitehead, 1978, pp.107~109). Whitehead is trying to account for what 
was then regarded by many as a natural "logic of relations" in causal processes.8 
However, some have been critical of Whitehead's adaptation of common tenns 
used to describe his complex process philosophy. Clarke claimed that "ctifficulties 
and uncertainties of interpretation serve to obscure the analogies that are the basis 
for ascribing mentality to subhuman forms in a way required by panpsychism" 
(Clarke, 2003, p.34). However, it has to be said, and is acknowledged by some of 
the current philosophers in the panpsychism debate, that to see the universe in 
terms of "events" rather than as a composite of individual particles has a certain 
appeal to panpsychists. To see the cosmos as "cosmosing" rather than as a static 
thing, to understand the universe as a verb rather than as a noun introduces, 
according to Whitehead, subjectival interiority.9 This idea clearly appeals to 
modem philosophers seeking a new panpsychic/panexperiential direction. 
Hartshorne refonnulated Whitehead's process philosophy, whilst retaining 
his "conception of mentality as an ordered sequence of psychic events or 
experiential occasions" (Clarke, 2003, p.37). He eliminates Whitehead's 
technically complex tenninology, and instead of taking up Whitehead's notions of 
Leibniz's monads, he used the tenn "feelings" to help describe these psychic 
events, immediately making it possible to then argue for panpsychism from 
analogy from human experience. He appeals to our own experiences of being lost 
in "feeling", losing all sense of subject and object, in that, when so immersed in 
the experience, subject and object become one. By analogy we are able to attribute 
mentality or "feelings" to various other forms of natural life. But to what extent, 
or at which point in the regression down through material life, can we take this 
analogical argument? Arguments for panpsychism from human analogy become 
8 See Bertrand Russell's chapter on Leibniz in HisiOIJ' of Weste/'11 Philosophy. Whitehead was well 
aware of Russell's criticism ofLeibniz's metaphysical system. Whitehead was Russell's teacher 
and mentor at Trinity College Cambridge in the 1890s. 
<>Whitehead's process philosophy develops the idea that each event has both a subjectival and 
objectival aspect in that it is seen as a process that allows for past "now" event to stream into the 
now "now" event in order to produce the future "now" event. This "now'' event contains within it 
both the physical pole of the past and now and the conceptual pole of the now and future, and as 
such is both subjective and objective. 
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pretty thin when we get down to simple molecular components or fundamental 
particles, simply because we are organised structures made up from parts which 
are also in themselves organised ·structures. The analogical extension of feelings 
or mentality, when there is no observed learning behaviour at primitive levels, or 
when the behaviour of fundamental particles is so different from our own, an 
essential criterion for the argument from analogy, is not viably justified. 10 D. S. 
Clarke rejects Hartshorne's appeal to indetenninacy as an indication of 
spontaneous behaviour at the quantum level (a spontaneity that Hartshorne 
declares is evidence of "faint degrees of feeling") on the grounds that 1) it does 
not conform to the basically accepted view of the behaviour of quantum 
particles11 , and that 2) "feelings" can not be analogically extended into the 
quantum world from human experience (Clarke, 2003, p.40). 
Thomas Nagel 
Thomas Nagel can be credited with fuelling the revival of the panpsychism 
debate. In his book Mortal questions, he suggests four simple premises underlying 
the concept of panpsychism. 1). Material composition: That no constituents 
besides matter are needed in the many simple and complex ever-changing 
arrangements in the universe. In other words, matter exists as the only building 
substance of the universe, 2). Non-reductionism: That mental, or feeling, or desire 
states, are not, or cannot be, reduced to physical properties. Mental subjective 
states as well as physical objective states also exist. 3). Realism: That those states 
are properties of the organism. 4). Non-emergence: That mind does not emerge 
from the workings of the universe (Nagel, 1979, pp.lSl-182). Nagel suggests that 
panpsychism seems to follow from these four premises. He makes the point that: 
If the mental properties of an organism are not implied by any physical properties 
but must derive from properties of the organism's constituents, then those 
constituents must have non-physical properties from which the appearance of mental 
properties follows ... (Nagel, 1979, p.\82). 
10 See D. S. Clarke's chapter 2 "Versions ofPanpsychism", in Panpsychism and the Religious 
Attitude (2003) and Hartshorne's appeal to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. 
11 The indetenninacy of quantum particles is not attributable to anything internal to the particle 
itself, as it is understood today, but is a result of an external observer. 
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He concludes that since any matter can compose an organism, all matter 
must have these properties and that those different combinations of matter 
produce different kinds of mental life as a kind of"mental chemistry." 
Nagel goes on to discuss the various problems that the argument can 
encounter in light of the four premises first postulated. From the perspective of 
realism, "conscious mental states are real states of something" and Nagel admits 
difficulties in establishing exactly what those mental states really are (Nagel, 
1979, p.l93). Offering three alternative interpretations he finds dissatisfaction 
with: I) that they are states of the body, 2) that they are states of the soul, and 3) 
that all we can say about their essence is to give criteria or conditions for their 
ascription, he asks: "But what is left?" He is ultimately led back to what he calls 
the "weakest premise in the argument", realism, suggesting that it is more 
plausible at the moment than its denial (Nagel, 1979, p.l93). He goes on to 
suggest that by simply denying any of the premises postulated, panpsychism 
becomes unacceptable as a solution to the mind-body problem. Denial of the first 
premise results in dualism. Denial of the second premise, according to Nagel, is 
motivated by the desire by philosophers to make the mind-body problem go away. 
Denial of the third premise, realism, is in his view more attractive, but awaits 
development of a viable alternative. And, denial of the fourth premise, non-
emergence, results in very difficult questions about how, when and why mental 
states arise. 
David Ray Griffin's Panexperientialism 
David Ray Griffin offers us an alternative to the cul-de-sac arguments 
posited by both the materialists and the dualists that have dominated the debate to 
the present. He makes the claim, borne out by the very recent flourish of authors 
entering the fray that a new situation has arisen. It is a situation not resulting from 
any parf~ular new discovery or decisive progress towards a solution to the 
mind/body problem, but one that has arisen by default: recognition, from 
prominent thinkers in this field, that it is unlikely that a solution will be found 
under the current predominate paradigms. As previously mentioned in section 1.1, 
Thomas Nagel has said that the drive to develop a physicalist account of mind has 
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led to "extremely implausible positions" (Griffin, 1998, p.4), and Colin McGinn 
argnes that our present perplexity is tenninal, that we will never be able to resolve 
the rnystery of how consciousness could emerge from the brain. He says: 
"Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of 
consciousness, but we draw a complete blank on the nature of this 
conversion ... The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how this 
miracle is wrought" (McGinn, 1982, pp.99-120). 12 Griffin goes as far as to 
suggest that a new and entirely radical approach is necessary to address the 
problem, agreeing with Nagel, 13 who asserts that "nothing but radical speculation 
gives us hope of coming up with any candidates for truth", and with Galen 
Strawson,14 who declares that "the enonnity of the mind-body problem" requires a 
"radical solution" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.5). Griffin's answer, although not 
claiming to have a radical solution but rather a direction not leading into a cul-de-
sac, is panexperientialism. 15 
Panexperientialism takes the position that all individual instances of reality 
in the universe are intrinsically experiential. It is the idea that the universe as such 
is experiencing, and not only experiencing, but experiencing itself in its entirety, 
penneating all levels of existence and being. 16 This way of thinking about the 
world, although difficult at first for those who are used to seeing and thinking in 
dualistic terms, at least allows for a different approach to the "hard problem", or 
"world knot" as Griffin calls it. Colin McGinn, arguing from a background in 
analytical philosophy, claims that the problem of consciousness is closed to 
human understanding (de Quincey, 2002, p.l85). McGinn denies we have the 
cognitive capacity for understanding the nature of the interaction between mind 
and body, even though he accepts the plain and obvious fact that the interaction 
exists. Griffin on the other hand believes the mind-body problem is amenable to 
rational analysis. 
12 See note 2. 
13 For a more detailed discussion see Thomas Nagel's A View from Nowhere (1986) 
14 For a more detailed discussion see Galen Strawson's Menial Realily (1994) 
15 Griffin prefers this term "panexperientialism" for two reasons: (1) The tenn "psyche" suggests 
that the basic units endure through long stretches of time, whereas they maybe momentary 
experiences; and (2) "psyche" inevitably suggests a higher fonn of experience than would be 
afpropriate for the most elementary units of nature (Griffin, 1998, p.78). 
1 
"Pan" means "all of', "everywhere'', or "the whole", or "universal". Therefore pan-experience 
means experience as an ingredient all through the universe, penneating all levels of being, and 
incorporating a degree of subjective interiority (de Quincey, 2002, p.l83). 
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De Quincey attempts to steer a line of argument that acknowledges 
McGinn's assertion that it is beyond human rationality to deduce a solution, but 
appeals to Griffin's notion in that it is knowable, albeit in an intuitive sense. De 
Quincey claims that: 
In order to know consciousness, and to know the relation between consciousness 
and the physical world, we will need to cultivate an alternative epistemology 
beyond the faculties of rational analysis and conceptual understanding.(de 
Quincey, 2002, p.187) 
Christian de Quincey's Radical Naturalism 
In Christian de Quincey's book Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul in 
Maller, he puts forward a strong argument for radical naturalism being the only 
real and viable solution to the puzzle of consciousness in matter, the "hard 
problem". This puzzle is not resolvable, he claims, by holding onto the "old 
story". The "old story" is de Quincey's tale of mechanism that posits matter as 
dead and insentient, a story based on ontological dualism that has been built 
slowly over the ages and handed down to us as scientifically based fact. It has 
been recognised, however, that the story's major premise: that matter is dead and 
devoid of consciousness, is also its major problem, because we do have minds. 
Which in tum raises the issue: how can mind emerge from matter if matter is 
inherently dead without mind? How can something that is inherently subjective 
realise itself out of something that is objectively dead? This old mechanistic story 
that matter is dead and insentient, and the phenomenon of mind as experienced by 
humans is merely the result of some kind of epiphenomenon of brain activity, is 
no longer acceptable to de Quincey. Let it be noted here, as de Quincey does, that 
Neo-Darwinians such as Richard Dawkins still argue that alllife-fotms were the 
sole result of chance mutations, and the blind selection of a dumb and "blind 
natural watchmaker"17, and that mind, soul or consciousness was viewed as a ''by 
product of chance events in mechanit;:al nature" (de Quincey, 2002, p.23). But, de 
Quincey says, the story started to unravel when "gaps or anomalies in the 
17 See Richard Dawkins' book The Blind Watchmaker (1986). 
23 
mechanistic worldview appeared with the advent of the new sciences 
relativity, 18 quantum, and complexity theories" 19 (2002, p.24). Einstein may have 
started this re-understanding of the nature of matter, but the greatest challenge to 
the 'old story' so far, as de Quincey points out, is Quantum theory. If, as de 
Quincey points out, the universe can not be so observed without the observer 
affecting the actual event being observed, then how can the universe be 
objectified, a prerequisite for the mechanistic scientific method? De Quincey puts 
it like this: "Clearly, if the subjectivity or the consciousness of an observer is 
somehow responsible for 'collapsing' quantum probabilities into an actual event, 
objectivity is compromised at a fundamental level" (de Quincey, 2002, p.26). Not 
only do quantum events collapse into being; they are also unpredictable and 
indeterminable.20 This, de Quincey rightly observes, brings into question the 
whole notion of a scientifically measurable observable universe. 
We cannot control that of which we are a part, without ourselves 
participating in the outcome(s). Because, as de Quincey points out, "every part 
contributes to the changes of the whole, and therefore the parts themselves" (de 
Quincey, 2002, p.31). De Quincey asserts that the old story is severely 
compromised, with "the old ideals of mechanism, reductionism, causal-
determinism, and objectivity undermined" (2002, p.33). 
18 Einstein's theory of relativity, although not suggesting any need for sentience, subjectivity, or 
consciousness in matter, did start to break do'Ml the generally accepted view of a mechanistic 
universe made up from solid particles of 'stuff' or 'things'. Einstein presented a picture of events 
(energy) rather than things (solid matter). A picture, not of"solid little bits of matter interacting 
mechanistically", but of"swirling dances and fluxes of energy exchanges" (de Quincey, 2002, 
p,.24). 
9 Experiments in "quantum mechanics" have demonstrated that two subatomic physical events 
occurring at the same time and related, that respond to each other, can happen even when they are 
at a 'super-luminal' distance. In other words, requiring communication beyond light speed contact. 
Further, quantum events occur, that is to say the world of actualities manifests, only when they are 
ob.~erved, in that, in the quantum universe it is the observer that collapses the quantum gaps (these 
gaps or waves contain "an infinite sea of quantum potential") into actuality (de Quincey, 2002, 
p.25). In these theories, quantum and chaos, it becomes meaningless to isolate individual parts- a 
cornerstone in mechanism theories, for everything relates to the whole. 
20 This indeterminacy, intrinsic to quantum events, has been expressed in Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg, 1958). The principle in effect states that it is impossible to 
predict, or measure with one hundred percent accuracy, where, at any given time, a particle is or 
will be in time and space and, as de Quincey suggests, this uncertainty is ontological, not merely 
epistemological uncertainty. 
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D. S. Clarke 
D. S. Clarke asserts that the only realistic position to take when we are 
considering mentality/mind and its relation to matter is the view supported by his 
"Origination Argument", and that is that mind/mentality has always existed. The 
argument from analogy allows us to consider the idea that mind is not unique to 
humans. By analogy we are able to posit that other life fonns, whether they are 
complex or somewhat less complex, have mentality. But, we are hard pressed to 
extend that analogy down into the world of fundamental particles, as there is very 
little, if anything, that could be considered analogous with human behaviour, 
except possibly the observed spontaneity or freedom with which these particles 
appear to move. 
Clarke's discussion regarding extending the panpsychist thesis down to 
fundamental particles admits this difficulty in establishing an analogical link to 
these universal building blocks. "Fundamental particles by definition are not 
organised wholes with parts," he says, "they are individuals persisting through 
time, but individuals so different in nature as to apparently exclude them from the 
scope of the panpsychist thesis" (Clarke, 2003, p.112). The problem is, as he notes 
later, if we exclude fundamental particles from the thesis, we have undennined the 
Origination Argument and are left with the same problem the argument is 
supposed to solve. De Quincey on the other hand actively promotes Quantum 
theory in relation to fundamental particles, as it turns the universal picture 'upside 
down' in terms of the way we have observed and consequently theorised, in the 
past, about the nature of matter. De Quincey uses the ideas surrounding the 
behaviour of fundamental particles to refute the mechanist account of reality. 
Quantum theory, he suggests, threatens all notions about casual activity, as 
quantum events are 'non-local' and 'non-causal', in that they are unhindered by 
distance (de Quincey, 2002, p.25).21 Clarke, on the other hand, appears to leave 
the matter of mind in fundamental particles somewhat unresolved, with an appeal 
to the incomplete knowledge of contemporary physics, suggesting that these 
fundamental particles might some day be discovered to be wholes with parts, 
hence allowing the argument from analogy to stretch down to them. 
21 See note 17. 
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Clarke rejects the argument from universal mechanism that applies to 
evolutionary theory in an attempt to explain the origination of mentality or 
consciousness. Clarke (2003, pp.l06-107), citing Fred Dretske, writes: "What 
natural selection starts with as raw material are organisms with assorted needs 
and variable resources for satisfying these needs. You don't have to be conscious 
to have needs." The argument here is that you don't have to be conscious to have 
needs but you do have to have needs to become conscious. In other words, the 
epiphenomenon of mind is an evolutionary response to human need as we 
evolved. Clarke counters this with the observation that the need to process 
infonnation, the claimed precedent cause for mentality, and the ability to process 
infonnation could have just as easily produced a zombie or "robot-like 
combinations of molecules with the capacity for differential responses that also 
lacked mentality" (Clarke, 2003, p.I08). The point that Clarke is trying to make 
in response to universal mechanism's evolutionary argument, is that you can not 
treat mentality as if were similar to the hom on a rhinoceros; acquired through 
evolution, rather pretty to look at, handy when under attack, but could probably 
get along just fine without it. Clarke claims that the evolutionary theory of the 
advent of mentality does not adequately account for the antecedent or origination 
of consciousness. "We are confronted," he asserts (Clarke, 2003, p.llO), "with a 
totally new aspect apparently without biological explanation for its origination." 
Following this and the apparent ongoing inability of mechanists to provide a 
reasonable explanation, including Daniel Dennett's attempt,22 Clarke asserts that 
the only plausible alternative, apart from Locke's notion of a Universal Mind23 
that he subsequently rejects, is the Origination Argument. 
22 Daniel Dennett, in his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, makes the claim that the origination of 
mentality is simply another evolutionary stage in the progression from primitive to more complex 
fonns of organisation, with this progression to be explained by the combination of random genetic 
variation and forces of natural selection ofDanvinian evolutionary theory (Clarke, 2003, p.I03). 
23 Locke's argument for God's existence is founded on the fact of our own experience of our own 
selves. Locke asserts: "Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our 
own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there 
is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whi!ther any one will please to call 
God, it matters not" (Locke, 1959, Bk IV, Ch X, p.6). 
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Freya Mathews 
Freya Mathews approaches the problem from a different perspective. 
Although claiming, as de Quincey does, that the old story is flawed in that it 
presupposes dualistic misconceptions, Mathews argues for a more personal and 
intimate relationship between ourselves and our universe. In her book, For the 
Love of Matter, Mathews develops a version of panpsychism that holds that the 
physical universe is an indivisible unity organised along the lines of a self~ 
realising system. She claims that our responses to environmental crisis and our 
current environmental philosophy are flawed as they are based on misconceived 
assumptions. She uses the term panpsychism to describe a truly non~dualistic view 
of matter that "implicates the mentalistic in the material" (Mathews, 2003, p.27). 
From this panpsychist perspective, all of reality has a subjectival dimension. 
Having a subjectival dimension is to say that matter, and all physical existence, 
are imbued with an inner principle that can be described in terms of subjectivity 
(Mathews, 2003, p.34). 
Mathews argues that any adequate philosophical response to the 
'environmental crises' cannot be encompassed within the minor discipline of 
environmental philosophy alone, but must instead appeal to a philosophical 
understanding that would address the full range of existential questions. She 
asserts that the Western retreat from a panpsychist ethos of "encounter" may be 
seen as a consequence of the Western experience of individuation, a direct and 
consequential result of a dualistic perspective. She urges us towards a more 
"passionate" and "erotic" encounter with the world, using a mythological and 
spiritual approach entwined with her arguments for a panpsychic worldview. 
Most of the philosophical debate concerning dualism has in the main 
centred on the relationship between mind and body in sentient beings and not 
around matter per se. As Mathews points out, matter per se remains, for most 
thinkers, the province of physics, and, as such, captive to the old dualistic 
presuppositions (Mathews, 2003, p.26). She holds that even though few scientists 
or philosophers these days subscribe to a dualistic theory of mind, in the sense of 
regarding mind as existing completely independently of matter, most of us still 
have a dualist way of seeing the world held together by old dualistic 
presuppositions. Mathews claims that materialism and idealism are in fact flip 
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sides of dualism itself, since "materiality is dualistically conceived from the 
perspective of materialism and ideality is dualistically conceived from the 
perspective of idealism" (Mathews, 2003, p.26). 
Mathews defends her argument for panpsychism from the perspective of 
realism, suggesting that subjectivity, as a field (of selfMpresence), as such, is 
ultimately indivisible. Although, bearing in mind that all material objects can be 
said, from a panpsychist perspective, to have a subjectival dimension, it is not true 
to say of all objects that they are subjects (Mathews, 2003, p.33). The idea that the 
universe is imbued with both subjectival and objectival dimensions is central to 
Mathews' ,argument for a panpsychist perspective of the universe. She asserts that 
"subjectivity is that field of self-presence out of which awareness springs" (2003, 
p. 7~). Although such self-presence is here ascribed to reality at large, she makes 
the point that it may be understood in "systems-theoretic terms" as a function of 
reflexivity of certain kinds of systems, namely those capable of making 
themselves the object or goal of their own activities. Such systems, which she 
describes as "selves", are, in other words, systems that are directed to their own 
perpetuation. They are, she says, in this sense, "selfMreferential" (2003, pp.47-48). 
According to Mathews the universe has to be able to refer to itself. This 
referentiality must occur at the level of intention, if it is to "pick itself out of the 
domain of possibilities and select itself for actualisation". She goes on to explain 
it further. "It is on account of the necessary self-referentiality that reality is as 
irreducibly subjectival as it is physical" (2003, p. 74). In order to explain how the 
universe is constellated as such Mathews argues that as there can be no others 
external to itself to which the world can reach out, it creates such others out of the 
fabric of itself. It is as if in reaching out for another it finds only itself, as it is only 
One, and has no other choice other than to create that which it reaches for. These 
others, of its own creation, Mathews asserts, consist of finite sub-systems that are 
also relatively self-realising: "out ofthe primordial desire of the global system/self 
an endless stream of relatively individuated finite systems/selves is constellated" 
(2003, p.74). 
Mathews makes the claim that it is fair to assume that the universe is self-
realising, and it follows that any universe that is selfMrealising is to the same 
extent self-actualising, otherwise how would it come into existence? But if 
something can bring itself into existence, then it must also be selfwreferential, 
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since it is itself that it brings into existence (2003, p.52). And, any universe that 
has a self~referential capacity entails that it necessarily has a subjectival 
dimension. It can be said that being a self-realising system, it proposes reflexivity 
and to this extent the universe is imbued with a subjectival dimension. This 
universal subjectivity, that Mathews promotes, is as fundamental to its 
metaphysical nature as is its physicality since its physicality is given only in the 
context of the self~referentiality, the reflexivity, required for its self~actualisation. 
According to Mathews (2003, pp.60~61), the "capacity of self-referentiality 
admits of twin aspects" and she has chosen two tenns to help describe what she is 
getting at here: the "conative" and the "orectic". Conatus is the will to self-
realisation and self~preservation, self-maintenance, and self-increase. Orexis, a 
Greek word meaning appetite, but including three conceptualised functions: 
desire, spirit, and wish, is the impulse to reach out to world. She describes it as 
"the desire for contact and connection with other-than-self' (Mathews, 2003, 
pp.60-61). 
According to Mathews, the interiority of matter can not be without drive or 
purpose. Understanding this, Mathews has attempted to find suitable tenns in an 
effort to capture these conceptual ideas. There not only has to be self-
referentiality, conativity, and its necessary subjectival capacity attributed to a 
systems framework, but there also has to be some kind of drive or will or desire, 
in order that it moves, evolves, always inviting change. Evolution simply would 
not work without such drives or capacities. The world would not tum. The 
universe would be static, standing still, nil. In a systems framework these 
capacities or drives, conativity and orexis are dialectically entwined, and she 
explains that the "conativity of the global self drives the cosmological expansion 
of space whilst its orectivity manifests as the self~differentiation of the physical 
manifold" (Mathews, 2003, p.73). She describes it as the self seeking both to 
articulate itself, distinguishing itself from its ontological matrix, and at the same 
time to lose itself, subsiding back into that matrix by mixing itself with others. 
And she makes the point that indeed, in order to articulate itself the self must enter 
into relations of mutuality with elements of its environment (Mathews, 2003, 
p.59). It (the universe) must respond to the orectic imperative, the 'self reaching 
out. And she makes a vital point here, that one cannot be separated from the other, 
since orexis is itself an expression of intentionality, and is hence the province of a 
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self, it can make itself felt only within a conative context. Conatus and orexis thus 
converge in the need of selves to engage in basically mutualistic relations. 
In trying to capture the inter~relationships in the cosmos, Mathews has 
borrowed from the ancient Chinese wisdom teachings of the Way, the Tao, to help 
her describe what she refers to as "The Way of the One and the Many". This Way 
is the means by which the Many, so long as they are left to follow the orectic 
course of their innate conatus, promote the selfwincrease of the One (Mathews, 
2003, p.64). According to Mathews, this gives rise to: 
... the metaphysical pattern of mutual self-articulation that unfolds when global self 
(the One) and finite selves (the Many) are allowed to follow their inner most 
promptings to engage mutualistical\y with one another. Given the conative vector at 
the core of creation, a tendency to generate ever-deeper possibilities of self-
realisation will be discernible in the unfolding of world (Mathews, 2003, p. 74). 
Se]fwincrease, gives rise to the possibility of self-decrease and Mathews 
explains how this, in some sense, is self-controlling. As any individual 
subjectival entities whose self~realisation causes self-decrease in the wider 
system will be "selected out of creation, not by conscious fiat, but by the 
exquisite ecological logic of the Way" (Mathews, 2003, p.66). However, 
Mathews asserts, since inter~subjective forms of contact and connection exceed 
merely appetitive forms in the degree of "self-potentiation" they are capable of 
producing the tendency towards self-increase, rather than self-decrease, and will 
translate into an evolution oflevels of awareness that allow for eros in additton to 
appetite. The Way of the One and the Many is thus, according Mathews, 
ultimately a path of erotic adaptation to reality. 
1.4 Monism, Dualism and Non-dual Dualism 
In the literature review we have traced the argument for a .. dualistic" 
mind/body relationship through to the "panexperiential" "non-dual duality" 
perspective. But, like the paradox of the disappearing mast outlined in section 2.2, 
there is something absurd about a notion of a ''non-dual duality". D. S. Clarke 
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posits his argument for panpsychism, the "Origination Argument", that is that 
mind/mentality has always been there, is based on his assertio;1 that it is the only 
realistic position to take when we are considering mentality/mind and its relation 
to matter. Both his argument from realism and the argument from analogy allow 
us to consider, with confidence, the idea that mind is not unique to humans. By 
analogy we are able to posit that other life fonns, whether they are complex or 
somewhat less complex:, have mentality. But, as Clarke notes, we are hard pressed 
to extend that analogy down into the world of fundamental particles, as there is 
very little, if anything, that could be considered analogous with human behaviour, 
except possibly the observed spontaneity or freedom with which these particles 
appear to move. But surely. if the "Origination Argument" has any merit we must 
ascribe subjective mentality to even the smallest fundamental particles. Otherwise 
we are still dealing with the problems associated with emergence and ultimately 
some fonn of dualism. And that is where Clarke has failed to convince. Unless the 
apparent dualistic relationship between mind and matter can be sufficiently 
explained you still have some fonn of dualism, in this case a "non-dual dualism." 
In Chapter 2, I will explain that with the "dual-aspect singularity" argument, mind 
and matter are the same thing. Mind does not emerge from matter and matter does 
not emerge from mind. They cannot be separated, as you cannot have one without 
the other. Any appearance of interaction between mind and matter is an 
experience of the singularity's dual-aspect. Mind and matter only appear as being 
separate. 
Why does this solution, the "dual-aspect singularity" argument, work when 
other solutions such as monism, dualism, and non-dual duality, have not? Because 
it recognises the basic dualistic nature of our perceived world but understands it as 
"dualistic aspectivism." That is, two aspects of the same thing. Neither materialist 
nor idealist monism provided an adequate philosophical base. Monistic 
materialism fails because it has been unable to account for mental facts. Once all 
the material facts have been deducted from the universe there appears to be certain 
undeniable mental facts left over that refuse to be reducible to material states. 
Monistic idealism fails for two different reasons 1). Idealism's association with 
pantheism and theism in general has muddied the waters, as it introduces the issue 
of good and evil and their relationship with God, perfect or otherwise. Dealing 
with problems of good and evil and providing an adequate explanation of the 
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obvious dualistic nature of the universe has found most philosophers declaring 
various fonnulations of monistic idealism indefensible (Levine, 1994, p.217). 2). 
Monistic idealism also has trouble explaining away matter just as monistic 
materialism has trouble explaining away mind. 
One might suggest that the problem with monism is that we have difficulty 
in pulling it apart to explain the dualistic nature of the universe and, likewise, the 
problem with dualism is that we have difficulty in sticking it back together again. 
Just as monistic materialists spend a lot of time and effort trying to prove mind 
does not exist in mental tenns, so too do dualists, who spend an awful lot of time 
attempting to explain the relationship between mind and matter once both have 
acknowledged existence. It can be argued that the '"dual~aspect singularity" is a 
fonn of monism, rather than a dualism, and this would be true. But, it is a monism 
that has not taken sides. The "dual-aspect singularity" is neither matter nor mind. 
Yet both are the dual aspects of it. 
The pure materialist would say nature may appear dualistic but everything 
in it can be reduced to matter, therefore there is only matter here. Most scientists 
and mainstream philosophers hold this materialist position. The problem is, as we 
have previously suggested, after all the so~called material facts have been added 
up, there seems to be a lot of other stuff, mental facts left over. These mental facts 
are a problem for materialists, as they do not readily reduce down to matter. 
Mental facts might be beliefs, desires or pains, etc. How to hang onto the basic 
tenets of materialism and at the same time explain mentality has been a quandary 
for many philosophers. As we will discuss in the second part of this thesis, the 
"dual-aspect singularity" argument has none of the above mentioned problems as 
it explains the dual nature of reality, but resolves that duality into a singularity by 
understanding it as a dual~aspectivism. 
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Chapter 2 - Experiencing the Whole Picture 
2.1 Personal Knowledge: Epistemologically Valid or Not? 
In the current panpsychism debate due consideration of actual panpsychic 
experiences, in the sense that I am proposing, has not been taken into account. A 
"panpsychic personal experience" is one in which mind and matter are 
experienced as one. It is an experience that is usually initiated by some kind of 
crisis, as described in the preface, or one that can happen when one is in deep 
contemplation or meditation, as recorded by Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and other 
practitioners, as well as by modem psychologists or individuals who practice 
meditation or deep forms of concentration. Freya Mathews' appeal to a more 
joyful and intimate relationship with the world on a personal level moves the 
debate in that direction, as she urges us towards a "passionate" and ''erotic" 
encounter with the world, but she fails to analyse the experience in a way that 
need not appeal to passion or eroticism. A state of deep concentration and 
meditation requires neither. 
My thesis for a "dual~aspect singularity" as a conceptualised perspective of 
the mind/body mind/matter relationship, a conundrum when considered in 
"dualistic" or "non-dual dualistic" terms, is an attempt to provide a definitive 
description of the mind/body mind/matter mind/world relationships. This 
perspective can be intuitively arrived at following what I have termed a "personal 
panpsychic experience". This type of experience has been well researched. 
Psychologist Abraham Maslow spent the latter part of his career studying and 
writing extensively about what he called "peak experience." Maslow describes 
characteristics of the peak experience: 
1. Perception is relatively ego-less. The individual fuses with objects into a new, 
larger whole. Objects are seen as free lium relations, purpose, or usefulness to 
anything else. 
2. Awareness of the past and future is lost. The person lives only in the moment, 
totally immersed in the here-and-now. A distortion of time and space occurs. 
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3. Nonual, everyday consciousness is widened and enriched, and one feels that 
one has experienced a higher, more direct state of consciousness, that one has 
perceived the true essence of things. (cited in Jacobs, 2003, p.70) 
As Maslow points out, the ego orientated "l" disappears, or as he puts it, it 
"fuses with objects into a new, larger whole", and "our dualistic perception 
dissolves into a single experience (Jacobs, 2003, p.70)." I have given further 
examples of "personal panpsychic experiences" in section 2.4 of this thesis. After 
having had this type of experience myself, along with several years of meditative 
practice, I have come to the conclusion that 1) everything that exists has both a 
mental and a material aspect that allows for both objectival and subjectival 
capacities; 2) that neither the mental nor the material are onto logically real; and 3) 
that the nonnal experience of reality is dualistic, but reality itself is singular and 
indivisible. 
I will now argue that the way to understand the mind/matter relationship is 
to consider the non-conceptualised experience of wholeness and unity, as defined 
in this thesis and described by Maslow, as reality and self-evident as long as it is 
grounded in the moment of the experience. If it can then be demonstrated that the 
experience is available to anyone who so chooses to pursue it through well 
documented methods, and if the records of those who have had the experience are 
also well documented, then this adds weight to my thesis. It provides us with a 
solution that allows the debate to move forward yet still acknowledges the 
dualistic nature of reality as we experience it in everyday life. I offer my argument 
for a "dual-aspect singularity" in three parts: 
1) That knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" is 
epistemologically valid. That is, that ontological knowledge of unity and 
wholeness, acquired under certain kinds of non-conceptualised personal 
experience(s), which I have called "personal panpsychic experie1_1ces", is 
epistemologically valid and needs to be taken into account when considering 
the mind/body mind/matter problem. 
2) That the perceived dualism, from our nonnal experience of subject~objective 
reality, is merely dual-aspectivism. That is, that by seeing the world around us 
in light of the knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic 
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experiences," knowledge that is epistemologically valid, we are justified to 
understand the dualism we normally experience as simply dual-aspectivism, a 
dual aspect of the same thing, a universal singularity. 
3) That the nature of some dilemmas puts them beyond our normal rational 
mental states of mind, which are subject to restrictive dualistic mental 
language, and as such we are often unable to resolve intuitively based 
ki1owledge problems. So the last part of my argument in support of my thesis 
for a "dmtl-aspect singularity" is a discussion about how we might be able to 
approach ihe mind/body paradox. I assert that one of the ways we can 
intuitively understand this thesis is in the application and consideration of the 
Moebius Principle. The Moebius Principle is important to my argument 
because it demonstrates that there are aspects and dimensions in reality that 
we have difficulty comprehending through our nonnal senses, and yet they 
obviously exist. Once the "dual-aspect singularity" thesis is accepted, 
panpsychism can also be understood as a realistic and understandable thesis in 
physical and mental terms. 
1). Ontological knowledge of unity and wholeness, acquired under certain 
kinds of non-conceptualised personal experience(s), "personal panpsychic 
experiences," is epistemologically valid and needs to be taken into account when 
considering the mind/body mind/matter problem. I argue that these particular 
"personal panpsychic experiences" are in fact epistemologically justifiable and 
can be claimed as rational as they do in fact adhere to the criteria demanded by the 
"evidentialists"24 where it applies. "Classical foundationalism,"25 broadly 
speaking, is the epistemological requirement that any belief should be supported 
by evidence that is self-evident, or evident to the senses, or incorrigible. I argue 
that the kinds of panpsychic experiences we are taking about are self-evident, in 
that once understood one sees them as true. It is evident to the senses in that it is 
not based on a conceptualised argument 9r thing, but is a real life event or 
24 
'Evidentialism', the roots of which can be found in the Enlightenment demand that all beliefs be 
subjected to searching criticism of reason; if a belief cannot survive the scrutiny of reason, it is 
irrational (Clark, 2004, p.2) 
25 
'Classical Foundationalism' is the demand that belief in God, or belief in anything rational, 
should be support by a foundation of certitudes that in general have to comply to the following: 
that the belief is self-evident, that it is evident to the senses, or that it is incorrigible (Clark, 2004, 
p.3). 
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experience in which one participates completely. I will go so far as to argue that in 
fact there is a heightening or enhancing of the senses. And, I will argue that it is 
incorrigible in that once experienced the world will always appear as "one" and 
"whole" to the individual. 
There can be no realistic argument in my view against the first condition: it 
is sufficient for a "belief'' to be considered rational if it is self~evident. For one 
thing I am presenting this type of knowledge, not as a "belief," but as direct 
ontological knowledge or knowledge acquired as a result of a real experience. As 
it is self-evident to the one who has had the experience it is therefore deemed 
rational. If I knowingly step into a hot bath the result of which is that I am now 
hot, that knowledge that I am hot requires no rationality assessment. I know I am 
now hot. It is only if I need to explain the experience to another, say a child for 
instance, then I might appeal to rationality. The bath is hot; if you get in you will 
feel hot. But, again it will only become evident to the child when he or she gets 
into the bath. Until such time any "belief' the child might have about the hot 
water is conjecture and open to question and demand for evidence. 
One possible argument against the idea that "personal panpsychic 
experiences" are self~evidential is that the knowledge of "unity" gained from such 
experiences is not available (to be self~evident) to anyone who has not had the 
experience just like the child who does not get into the bath. This may be true but 
this can not be a valid argument against the notion itself, but rather an 
acknowledgment that for those who have no self-evidentiary experience of a 
panpsychic nature the matter becomes one of"belief'' only. Just as the child who 
refuses to believe the water is hot, but instead insists the water is cold, but refuses 
to get into the bath, the onus is now on the child to provide a rational explanation 
for the belief that the water is cold when it is in fact hot, rather than on the person 
who simply experienced a hot bath. 
On the second point that it is a sufficient condition for a belief to be rational 
if it is evident to the senses, I reiterate that it is not a conceptualised belief but an 
actual experience that takes place. One might argue that it is not evident to the 
senses because the experience might be considered elusive or in some sense 
visionary. It is true that during these experiences the senses are not operating in 
nomtal mode so to speak. As we shall see later from descriptions, time seems to 
slow down. Solid objects such as mountains and walls may appear penetrable and 
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plastic. And, as the sense of "I" fades away, I smell, I see, I hear etc., become a 
redundant relationship, because the smell, or the sight, or the noise, and I, become 
one and the same. Subject and object merge together into a unity. If anything I 
would suggest that the senses become enhanced. 
The only counter arguments to the above might be one of questionable 
sensory perception. Like the child who does not get into the bath we might also 
suggest that the person having the experience has got it wrong, that their senses 
" have misinterpreted the event. But, these experiences are well documented if not 
well understood. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, a psychologist, after interviewing 
literally thousands of individuals over a twenty year period, describes in his book 
Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, that when people have these 
optimal experiences, most report that time proceeds much faster than usual; hours 
seem to pass by in minutes. In Csikszentmihalyi' s words: 
What slips below the threshold of awareneSs is the concept of selL People stop being 
aware of themselves as separate from the actions they are perfonning. And being 
able to forget temporarily who we are seems to be very enJoyable. Loss of the sense 
of a self separate from the world around it can lead to a feeling of union with the 
environment, self-transcendence, and a feeling that the boundaries of our being have 
been pushed forward, so that the person is transported into a new reality, to 
previously undreamed-of states of consciousness. (cited in Jacobs, 2003, p.69) 
As we are talking about a sensory experience, one that is well documented 
and recognised as such, any argument against it not being evident to the senses 
would surely fail. 
On the third point that it is incorrigible: I argue that one is left in no doubt 
about the validity of the experience, and that the ''personal panpsychic 
experience" is grounded in "real" experience. It is not merely a state of euphoria, 
although one might feel euphoric at the same time. If I were to suggest that the 
world seems to be "one" or "whole", then seeming to be "one" could be 
considered not incorrigible, for tomorrow it may seem different. But, again the 
experiences we are suggesting are not "seeming to be" or "it appears as if' type 
beliefs or assertions. They are well-documented "direct experiences" of reality 
once the cognitive part of the brain shuts off. As Dr Gregg Jacobs points out, in 
his book The Ancestral Mind: "A hallmark of the mystical state is an intuitive 
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sense of 'realness' in which one 'sees' rather than thinks. The world is perceived 
more directly, and the vividness and richness of nonnal waking consciousness are 
greatly enhanced" (Jacobs, 2003, p.72). The belief one forms from "personal 
panpsychic experiences" are incorrigible because they are direct knowledge 
experiences. After the experience, one is left in no doubt about the experience, 
just as the experience of a hot bath leaves no doubt about the temperature of the 
bath water. 
2). In the second part of my thesis I argue that perceived dualism is merely 
dual-aspectivism. This is my assertion: that by perceiving the world around us in 
light of the knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" we 
are able to understand dualism as simply dual-aspects of the same thing, a 
universal singularity. 
The cognitive part of our minds constantly reinforces the dualistic nature of 
our world. We see our world as object. In an ordinary state of everyday 
consciousness we feel separate from the world and experience it as such. Even the 
language we use supports this view. "I love you," "You made me angry," "I see 
the mountain" etc. We experience the world as in "relationship" to us, and our 
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mentality is very good at relationships. But this "I" that I associate with "myself' 
or "me" can be considered somewhat of a philosophical mystery. Peter Strawson 
in his chapter "Persons, "26 asserts that "the I occurs in philosophy through the 
fact that the 'world is my world.' The philosophical "I" is not the man, not the 
human body, or the human soul...but the metaphysic8:l subject, the limit- not a 
part of the world" (cited in LeDoux, 2002, p.I9). MY argument is that the "I" 
asserts itself when we are using our reasoning or 'cognitive mentality and 
consequently disappears when we are simply just being. In a state of deep 
meditation, as we can see from the examples I provide in the thesis, all mental 
chatter (thinking) ceases. The thinking "I" no longer dominates our coqscious 
interaction with the world and we are simply being. My assertion is that being is a 
"one thing" experience, whereas thinking is always a "two things" e~eri~nce. In 
thinking we are able to divide, separate, and isolate. In being, once thinking has · 
26 Strawson, P. 1959. In Individuals. London: Methuen 
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ceased and is no longer able to create a veil of dualism, we are simply whole and 
experience the world as such. 
We have evolved and survive today as either an individual or as a species in 
part because of our ability to handle relationships. The human mind isn't just 
cognitive but also has several other states of consciousness, such as subconscious 
or emotional states. According to LeDoux, cognitive scientists now reject the view 
handed down from Descartes that mind and consciousness are the same thing 
(LeDoux, 1996, p.29). They recognise that there are many levels of consciousness 
within mind and this has given rise to a whole new area of cognitive research 
sometimes referred to as "emotional intelligence". This realisation that mind is 
more than just cognition and that there is a direct correlation between the mind 
and the biological self still has cognitive researchers and consequently 
philosophers puzzling for an adequate and philosophically descriptive solution. 
Antonio Damasio, Van Allen Distinguished Professor and head of neurology at 
the University of Iowa, summed up his latest perspective on the mind body 
relationship after years of research: " ... the mind is part of that well-woven 
apparatus. In other words, body, brain and mind are manifestations of a single 
organism" (Damasio, 2003, p.195). 
This "single organism" simply creates the "I" in order to get the cognitive 
job done, and in so doing, and by default, generates its own division, creating its 
own duality. There is no duality; there is simply a dual aspect of the one and the 
same thing. 
3). This leads me to my third point; that the nature of some dilemmas puts 
them beyond our normal rational mental states of mind, which are subject to our 
restrictive dualistic mental language, as such we are unable to resolve intuitively 
based knowledge problems. So the last part of my argument in support of my 
thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" is a discussion about how we might be able 
to intuitively approach the mind/body paradox. I assert that one of the ways we 
might intuitively understand this thesis is the Moebius Principle. The Moebius 
Principle is important to my argument because it demonstrates that there are 
aspects and dimensions in reality that we have difficulty comprehending through 
our normal senses. Once the Moebius Principle is accepted, panpsychism can also 
be understood as a realistic and understandable thesis. 
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The Moebius Principle is a modern quandary found in the branch of 
qualitative mathematics known as topology. Steven Rosen, in his book Science, 
Paradox, and the Moebius Principle, illustrates the paradox extremely well (1994, 
pp.7-9). If you take a sheet of normal office paper and cut a one-inch strip off one 
side and then simply join the ends of the cut strip together with a piece of tape, 
you will have a cylindrical ring with an inside surface and an outside surface. If 
you now draw a line in the centre all the way around on the inside, and another 
line all the way around on the outside, again in the centre, you will now have a 
good representation of dualism. The outside line we might designate as 
representing matter and the inside line as representing mind. If you press together 
your finger and thumb with the paper between and your fingers on the line 
anywhere on the ring, you have in some sense taken a slice of reality indicating a 
duality. You have matter and mind separate by virtue of the two surfaces of our 
cylinder and yet immediately and correspondingly together captured between your 
thumb and forefinger. Now, if you undo the tape holding the paper in a cylinder 
shape and turn one end over and then re-attach the tape you will now have a twist 
in the paper slip. This is called the Moebius strip and it is fundamentally different 
from the cylinder strip. Certainly we can still place the thumb and the forefinger, 
as before, anywhere along the centre of the strip and they will appear to have 
again captured our duality of mind and matter. But this time there are no two 
surfaces, inside and outside. To prove this, take a pen and redraw the line and you 
will discover only one line and therefore only one surface! This time there is no 
duality as such, only two aspects of the same thing as you place your thumb and 
finger together anywhere on the strip, because both the surfaces you touch are in 
fact the same surface. This is an excellent analogy for the nature of the "dual­
aspect singularity." As Rosen asserts, "the two sides of the Moebius are but one 
side ... and we begin to see in the Moe bi us surface a visual/geometric 
representation of the union of opposites" (Rosen, 1994, p. 9). 
Problems with Rationality 
Ever since the Enlightenment and the elevation of Reason (with a capital R), 
any rationality associated with beliefs in religion, not to mention paganism, or 
mysticism, has been denied by some. And as a result, an extraordinary and 
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unwarranted demand has been placed on such beliefs; that the levels of evidence 
required claiming rationality far out strip that required of other philosophical 
positions. Even though I have argued that knowledge derived from "personal 
panpsychic experiences" passes the test for rationality, the question remains, is 
rationality necessary and sufficient for this knowledge? If rationality is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for truth, and this particular knowledge encapsulates a 
truth, then it can be argued that rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
this particular knowledge. The problem requires a more intuitive approach. The 
Moebius Principle demonstrates this point well. Our normal rational mind has 
difficulty working out the dimensional spaces in the workings of the Principle, but 
the truth of it can not be denied. And yet, the experience of placing our fingers 
either side of the strip or following the centre line to discover it is one line and not 
two, is an experience of this truth that is known intuitively. 
If we applied classical foundationalism' s demands to our own beliefs of the 
past or inductive beliefs about the future we would soon come to the inevitable 
conclusion that they can not be rationally justified. Again, moral beliefs, as Clark 
points out (2004, p.6), are not well justified on the basis of argument or evidence 
in the classical foundationalist sense. Another criticism of classical 
foundationalism comes from Alvin Plantinga, claiming that the criteria demanded 
by classic foundationalism are self-referentially inconsistent, in that classic 
foundationalism is in itself neither self-evident or evident to the senses, nor is it 
incorrigible (Clark, 2004, p.6). Clark describes incorrigible beliefs as "first person 
states (seeming or appearance beliefs) about which I cannot be wrong." 
The main problem with the evidentiary demand to demonstrate rationality is 
that rationality is no harbinger for the truth. Rationality merely reflects the status 
quo of any particular population at any one time. Firstly I would make the point, 
as Clark does in his essay on Religious Epistemology, that "rationality is more a 
matter of how one believes than what one believes" (Clark, 2004, p.l). In other 
words and as we have already stated, rationality does not equate to truth. It is quite 
possible to hold that something is true but to have come by that belief irrationally. 
For example I might believe the world is round because every night I flap my 
arms and fly around it. Conversely, at one time it was rational for people to 
believe that the earth was flat. And finally as this suggests and as Clark points out, 
"rationality is person and situation specific" (Clark, 2004, p.1 ). In other words, 
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what might be rational for someone at one time and one place, given certain socio-
historical circumstances, may be quite irrational for another in a different time and 
place; or, for that matter, what is rational for a person in the same time and place 
may be quite irrational for another, due to different experiences. 
• 
Let me repeat; in order to solve intuitively based knowledge problems we 
need to include intuitively based knowledge, or at least allow this form of 
knowledge to be considered. If reasoned thinking and rational arguments are the 
very constructs that prevent us from understanding our reality in this regard, if 
they are the very things that create this perceived duality, then we need to put 
thinking aside and attempt to intuitively grasp the true nature of our reality. 
Mind-maller Mind-brain 
It might be argued that even though the panpsychic thesis addresses the 
mind-matter or mind-world problem, how does it resolve the mind-brain 
di~tinction? First, you would have to assert that the two issues, mind-matter and 
mind-brain are somehow unrelated. I reject this on the grounds that the brain is 
matter. Certainly it is a complex organisation of matter, but there doesn't appear 
to be any reason to leave it outside the scope of the thesis or separate one kind of 
matter from another. If we accept that mind and matter are merely dual aspects of 
' 
a singularity, and that any distinction between mind and matter is merely illusory, 
then we also have to accept that any distinction between mind and brain is also 
illusory. I do not see any problem with this view. The thesis takes into account all 
matter, including brain matter. If however, you assert that it is a brute biological 
fact that consciousness is a product of brain, as John Searle does (Searle, 1997,_ 
p.l58), then you may consider there is a problem with accepting my thesis that 
mind and matter are in fact indistinct. But, I agree, as Searle asserts, that the brain 
causes consciousness, and is in fact responsible for all states of human 
consciousness. I agree because, I am not making a ciaim that consciousness and 
matter are indistinct. 1 am asserting that mind and matter are indistinct. I am using 
"mind" in a broader sense as defined it) the section Terms Defined. This allows for 
the normal workings of consciousness to go about its mental workings but 
suggests that there is more to mind than mere consciousness. And, it is this 
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expanded mind that is one with matter, which we experience when we have a 
"personal panpsychic experience." 
Paradox, Anomalies and the Dual-aspect Singularity 
According to the Oxford Dictionary a paradox is a statement that, whether 
true or false, seems or is absurd. Any statement that is in conflict with a 
preconceived idea or notion yet is in itselftrue, tends to be paradoxical. Anyone in 
Europe who watched the tall masts of a boat disappear down gently over the 
horizon, when it was widely believed that the world was flat, would have been 
confronted with a paradox. On the one hand the earth was flat, and on the other 
hand the boat's masts would indicate that the vessel was 'sinking' over the 
horizon and yet returning at a later date. The accepted notion and as such the 
rational notion, that the earth is flat is a good analogy with the current generally 
accepted notion that the mind and body are separate. But the paradox becomes 
apparent when from a realistic point of view it becomes obvious that some crucial 
obsetvations simply do not fit into the framework provided by the so-called 
known facts. This, in both cases, gives rise to all kinds of partial stories in an 
attempt to fill the gaps in logic, whilst trying to remain faithful to the original 
concept. Ultimately the paradox remains until such time as a new understanding is 
brought to bear on the problem and all anomalies are resolved. The anomaly of the 
disappearing mast is resolved when it is understood that the earth is round and not 
flat. The anomaly of dualism and how it arises is resolved when it is understood 
that there were never two things happening here, only one. 
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2.2 Examples of Personal Pan psychic Experiences 
All phenomena are mind, mind is all. Mind contains 
rivers, mountains, moon, and sun. 
Japanese Zen master Dogen 
My thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" perspective is based on an 
argument validating non-conceptualised experience, the "personal panpsychic 
experience." It is based on a real experience that can either come about by virtue 
of an event, and possibly but not necessarily, a crisis event, or from a concerted 
effort of a supervised or not-supervised practice that results in an experience of a 
'non-dual' unity or wholeness. The world is not made up from a chaotic and 
' 
random mix of objectivised and individualised separated bodies, of varying 
complexities, some of which appear to interact, but, it is a world that is in fact 
"whole" and "one" and only fragmented and dualistic in appearance. I draw your 
attention to those who have had similar experiences to that which is in the preface 
and as a result of those revelations see the unity or oneness of the world. I do not 
wish to draw on the "religious experience" per se, as any individual 
conceptualised interpretation, religious or otherwise, is immaterial to the point 
being made here. Any experience of this nature, whether it is as a result of effort 
or crises may be interpreted in many different ways, but, and this is my assertion, 
the original experience is real, non-conceptual and ontologically valid, and, the 
nature of these experiences is one of non-duality, of unity or oneness. 
I wish to again make it quite clear at this point that I am not making any 
argument for the existence of God, or that the "singularity" is God, even though 
many in the past have identified God with the experience of unity or oneness. If 
you were to ask what is the "'singularity" I would suggest it was absolutely 
everything, the dual aspects of which manifest as mind and matter. Many 
throughout history have had these experiences of oneness, completeness, and 
wholeness, and have attempted to interpret and describe the experience in many 
different ways. Whole new religions have blossomed from them, all with different 
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interpretations. And, in some cases, Buddhism for example, there are many 
different interpretations and schools of thought within the one religion. Having 
said that, it is to religion that I am obliged to tum for corroborating evidence of 
the "personal panpsychic experience," and where we find a rich background of 
discussion surrounding the dualistic nature of ordinary human perception. 
As stated, Buddhism has many different branches, but all branches are from 
the single tree and the roots of that tree are firmly embedded in the experience of 
the Buddha's enlightenment. It is a state in which one is no longer entangled in 
duality. In Nagarjuna's Treatise of Great Understanding (Mahaprajnaparamita 
Sutra) it is explained like this: 
All phenomena can be understood to be in two categories: mind and matter. On the 
conceptual level, we distinguish mind and matter, but on the level of awakening, all is 
mind. Object and mind are both marvellous. Mind is matter, matter is mind. Matter 
does not exist outside of matter. Mind does not exist outside of matter. Each is in the 
other. This is called the non-duality of mind and matter (Hanh, 1974, p.89) 
There is a clear statement resolving the duality on mind and matter in an 
ancient Buddhist text. Hanh goes on to explain that when we discriminate between 
subject and object, we are removed from Zen and its guiding principle of non-
duality. The doctrine of Vijnanavada, one of the Mahayana Buddhist schools, says 
that "the word 'knowledge' (vijnana) indicates at the same time the subject and 
the object of knowledge. The subject and object of knowledge cannot exist 
independently of each other" (Hanh, 1974, p.90). In order to explain the non-
conceptual experience of non-duality, Hanh uses the analogy of simply drinking 
tea. When we have some tea, we have a direct experience of the tea. The 
experience of drinking tea is not a concept. Only afterwards can we reflect on it 
and distinguish between this and other experiences. "At the moment of the 
experience, you and the taste of the tea are one. There is no differentiation. The 
tea is you, and you are the tea. There is not the drinker of the tea and the tea being 
enjoyed, because there is no distinction between subject and object in the real 
experience" (Hanh, 1974, p.88). At the core of Buddhism is the practice of 
meditation and the purpose of that meditation is to stop thinking, to cease the 
constant prattle that persists within us, constantly reinforcing itself and 
conceptua\ising the way we perceive our world. The Buddhist master Huang Po, 
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in speaking of the reality of true nature (what he called "the mind of unity and 
thusness"), said: 
Buddhas and living beings participate in the same pure and unique mind. There is no 
separation concerning this mind. Since time immemorial this mind has never been 
created or destroyed; it is neither green nor yellow; it has neither fonn nor aspect; it is 
neither being nor non-being; it is neither old nor new, neither short nor long, neither 
big nor small. It transcends all intellectual categories, all words and expressions, all 
signs and marks, all comparisons and discriminations. It is what it is; if one tries to 
conceive it, one loses it. Unlimited like space, it has no boundaries and cannot be 
measured. This mind is unity and thusness.lt is Buddha (Hanh, 1974, p.80). 
It is not my purpose here to suggest that the above is "dual-aspect 
singularitivism" as such but, rather to provide examples of a parallel experience of 
reality that certainly endorses the monistic aspect of my thesis. D S Clarke, in his 
latest book Panpsychism: Past and Present Selected Readings, also draws our 
attention to Buddhism, and in particular to Tiantai Buddhism, 27 and points out that 
the teachings of the Gotama Buddha, expressed in the early Buddhist sutras, can 
be regarded as an early expression of an unrestricted panpsychism (Clarke, 2004 
p35). Sogyal Rinpoche, a Buddhist meditation master, in his book The Tibetan 
Book of the Living and Dying describes the two fundamental aspects of mind. The 
first is the ordinary mind sem: "'That which possesses discriminating awareness, 
that which possesses a sense of duality - which grasps or rejects something 
external - that is mind. Fundamentally it is that which can associate with an 
"other' -with any 'something', that is perceived as different from the perceiver 
(Rinpoche, 1992, p.46)." So "sem" is the mind that thinks, plots, desires, 
manipulates, that flares up in anger, that creates and indulges. It is the mind that 
goes on and on asserting, validating, and confirming its 'existence' by 
fragmenting, conceptualising, and solidifying experience. Then, according to 
Rinpoche (1992, p.47), "'there is the very nature of mind, its innermost essence, 
which is absolutely and always untouched by change ... " and later " ... under 
27 Tiantai Buddhism is a school within Mahayana Buddhism that flourished in China from the 
seventh to the tenth century, and was transmiued to Japan as Tendai Buddhism. In Jacqueline 
Stone's Original Enlightenment and the Transfonnation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Stone 
says that this variety of Buddhism claims that "all beings are enlightened inherently, Not only 
human beings, but ants and crickets, mountains and rivers, grasses and trees are all innately 
Buddha." (cited in Clarke, 2004, p.36) 
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certain special circumstances, some inspiration may uncover for us glimpses of 
this nature of mind". He goes on to say that it can never be said too often that to 
realise the nature of mind is to realise the nature of all things. 
These experiences are not confined to any one particular theosophy or 
theology. Christian mysticism also has many stories that confinn this type of 
knowledge. As a direct result of a "severe crisis" he had at the seminary at Barby, 
Friedrich Schleiennacher's essays on religion reflect this idea. In his publication 
On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, Schleiennacher bewails the loss 
of the 'religious experience' in favour of a more orthodox and rational religion. 
Schleiennacher talks about "these systems of theology, these theories of the origin 
and the end of the world, these analysis of the notion of an incomprehensible 
Being, wherein everything runs to cold arguf)ring, and the highest can be treated 
in the tone of a corhmon controversy" (Schleiennacher, 1958, p.l5). We are 
getting here the strongest assertion from Schleiermacher that religion is something 
to be experienced rather than learnt, that you will "find little in sacred books," that 
it is more to do with "feeling" or "intuition" (Schleiermacher, 1958, p.16) 
Another example of these life·changing experiences can be found in the life 
of Jacob Boehme, a 161h century Christian mystic in whose argument for the 
existence of God we can see his panpsychism flourish, as he establishes the 
premise of non-emergence of mind in the universe. For he writes (Waterfield, 
2001, p.123); "Therefore now if the etemal.mind were not, out of which the 
eternal will Gaeth forth, then there would be.no God. But now therefore there is 
an etemal mind, which generateth the eternal heart of God, and the Heart 
generateth the light, and the light the virtue, and virtue the spirit, and this is the 
Almighty God." But, the eternal mind is in the darkness and it conceiveth its will 
to the light. Therefore: God, the universe and everything, emerges from mind 
(which is nothing). Any argument about Boehme's panpsychism would revolve 
not around the issue of emergence of mind from the universe, but of the universe 
emergin-g from mind 
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2.3 Conclusion 
When I first started researching the panpsychism debate I was struck by the 
notion that the debate about mind/body was in some sense stuck and could not 
progress any further without a "radical solution" being found, as suggested by 
Galen Strawson (Griffin, 1998, p.S). As I detailed in the section The Significance 
oft he Panpsychism Debate, several philosophers in the panpsychism debate share 
this view. Consequently, I set out to develop a radical solution to the mind~matter 
mindwbody problem. That radical solution is the "dualwaspect singularity" 
perspective. 
The premise for the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective lies in what I have 
termed the "personal panpsychic experience". Within these ''personal panpsychic 
experiences" the distinction between mind and the world of matter vcinishes, and 
the individual is left with the deep~seated ontological kn,owledge that the nature of 
our universe is single and not dual. I have argued that this knowledge is 
epistemologically valid as it satisfies the criteria fur evidential rationality. -Even 
so, I acknowledge that individuals who have not had a "personal panpsychic 
experience'' wili have difficulty in reaching the same conclusion through a 
rational process. However, I have explained, using the e'iample of the Moebius 
Principle as a visual/geometric representation of the union of opposites (Rosen, 
1994, p.9), how we can approach this intuitively based (for those without direct 
panpsychic experience) knowledge problem. I have given examples of_these types 
of experiences and even demonstrated that there is nothing new about them. 
I have arrived at the "dual~aspect singularity" solution to the rnind~body 
mind-matter paradox by way of the following argument: 1). After having had a 
"personal panpsychic experience," an experience that I have argued as being 
epistemologically valid, one realises that the dualities we experience in our 
everyday thinking lives are illusory. This is because it is the cognitive part of our 
brain~consciousness that separates, divides, and isolates. It can do this by creating 
' dualistic relationships between itself, the created "I," and the rest of the world. 
However, what appears to be dualistic is merely dual in aspect only. This dual~ 
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aspectivism becomes apparent when one has a "personal panpsychic experience" 
where the "I" falls away, as described in my thesis. 2). If dualistic relationships in 
the universe are onto logically not real, then we left with no choice but to conclude 
that the true nature of the universe has to be singular. Again this knowledge of a 
whole, or unified universe becomes apparent through having a "personal 
panpsychic experience." 3). If we now reduce the universe down to its essential 
elements/aspects of matter on the one hand and mind on the other, we can now 
say that (a). Everything that exists has both a mental and a material aspect. (b). 
But, neither the mental nor the material are ontologically real acco~ding to I), that 
"personal panpsychic experiences" acknowledge this and are epistemologically 
valid. Therefore (c) both mind and matter exist as aspects of a sinb'tdar universe. 
That is that the universe is in essence a "dual-aspect singularity" the nature of 
which becomes irrelevant because absolutely everything is contained within the 
"singularity" but manifests through its "dual-aspectivism." 
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Epilogue 
No doubt some of you are wondering what exactly happened on that lonely 
beach on the East Coast of Fraser Island. Whenever I've told the story and finish 
at the same point as in the preface, it prompts the question: So what happened to 
you? To which I love to say "I died of course!" But, what really happened was 
this: 
After a while my attention returned to the beach and I was wondering 
how long seven seconds was and whether or not the time had passed 
Just a short way up the beach an angler was standing in waders in the 
small surf I moved towards him, I must at this time have looked 
rather like I was in some sort �f shock, because he asked me what was 
wrong? "I've been bitten, " I said "How long have I been standing 
there?" I asked "You've been standing there for over half an hour. " I 
was shocked "For half an hour?" "Yep, at least. " He assured me. "I 
thought I was bitten by a sea snake, " I said, showing him the tiny bite 
marks. "That'll be an eel mate. Lots of eels around here, that's why 
I'm wearing waders, those buggers can hurt. " I moved away out of 
the surf and fell exhausted on the beach. 
Since that day I have re-discovered the expenence I had on the beach 
without the trauma of a near-death experience. And life has never been quite the 
same ever smce. 
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